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LEGISLATION BLOCKING ANTITRUST INVESTIGATIONS  
AND THE SEPTEMBER 2012 RUSSIAN EXECUTIVE ORDER 
Marek Martyniszyn1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article offers a typology of so-called blocking legislation and analyses its development, functions 
and legality under international law. It also presents and discusses the new Russian blocking Order, 
issued in September 2012, focusing on its possible effects on the European Commission’s 
investigation of Gazprom’s business practices (in light of EU competition law) as well as, more 
broadly, on foreign operations of Russian strategic enterprises. 
 
Disclaimer: This is a pre-edited manuscript. The final, edited version was published  
in Issue 37(1) of World Competition. It is available online at 
http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=WOCO2014006       
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2012 the President of the Russian Federation issued an Executive Order on Measures 
to Protect Russian Federation Interests in Russian Legal Entities (the blocking Order).2 The Order 
hinders foreign investigations and enforcement of foreign decisions and judgments against Russian 
strategic enterprises. In particular, it subjects the compliance with any foreign requests for 
information or discovery requests and with potential foreign decisions and judgments (especially 
behavioural and structural remedies) to prior authorization by a respective federal executive body 
authorized by the Russian government. The consent shall not be granted if the sought actions are 
considered harmful to Russia’s economic interests. 
Blocking legislation is not a new invention. It has been used in the past—most often in antitrust to 
shorten the long arm of US jurisdiction. It developed over time from a narrowly crafted measure 
focusing on particular sectors of economy and usually blocking foreign discovery, to measures of 
more general application, affecting foreign enforcement efforts also beyond the investigation stage. 
The new Russian Order serves similar functions, but it also has features unseen in the blocking 
legislation of other States. 
                                                          
1
 Lecturer in Law, Queen’s University Belfast, e-mail: m.martyniszyn@qub.ac.uk. Thanks to Spencer Weber 
Waller and Bruce Wardhaugh for their comments on earlier drafts of this piece. 
2
 Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation No 1285 of 11 September 2012 on Measures to 
Protect Russian Federation Interests in Russian Legal Entities’ Foreign Economic Activities [Указ Президента 
РФ от 11 сентября 2012 г. N 1285 "О мерах по защите интересов Российской Федерации при 
осуществлении российскими юридическими лицами внешнеэкономической деятельности"],  (2012), 
http://text.document.kremlin.ru/document?id=70125938&byPara=1 (accessed 11 Nov. 2013). For a short 
press release in English see Executive Order on Measures Protecting Russian Interests in Russian Legal Entities’ 
Foreign Economic Activities,  (11 Sept. 2012), http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/4401 (accessed 11 Nov. 2013). 
For is original Russian text and an unofficial English translation see Annex I (p 12). 
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The blocking Order seems to be an early Russian official response to the European Commission’s 
investigation of Gazprom’s business practices.3 The Commission has concerns that Gazprom may be 
abusing its dominant market position in upstream gas supply markets in Central and Eastern 
European Member States, in breach of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).4 The blocking Order was signed by the Russian President a week after the European 
Commission announced the opening of the formal proceedings and it was not anticipated.5 
This article makes a twofold original contribution to the existing literature. First, it offers a typology 
of blocking legislation and analyses its development, functions and legality under international law. 
Second, it presents and discusses the new Russian blocking Order, focusing on its possible effects on 
the European Commission’s investigation of Gazprom’s business practices as well as, more broadly, 
on foreign operations of Russian strategic enterprises. 
II. TYPOLOGY 
The phrase ‘blocking legislation’ (or ‘blocking statutes’) describes domestic laws and provisions 
which result in hindrance, or obstruction of foreign enforcement measures. Five main types of such 
legislation can be distinguished: (1) ‘pure’ blocking legislation, (2) privacy protection legislation, (3) 
professional secrecy laws, (4) bank secrecy laws, (5) laws on classified information (State secrets). 
‘Pure’ blocking legislation (blocking legislation in the narrow sense) denotes legislation which directly 
and principally negatively affects or obstructs foreign enforcement measures. From a foreign 
perspective it seems that this is the raison d'être of such measures, although from the perspective of 
the forum they are typically enacted to protect sovereignty and a State’s important interests. Four 
other identified types of legislation serve primarily other functions, while having an ancillary capacity 
of negatively impacting on foreign enforcement measures. 
By looking at different types of affected foreign enforcement measures (a distinction based on the 
stage of foreign enforcement being affected), one can differentiate between blocking legislation: (1) 
hindering foreign investigatory or adjudicatory processes, and (2) frustrating or obviating 
                                                          
3
 European Commission, IP/12/937, Antitrust: Commission Opens Proceedings Against Gazprom (4 Sept. 2012), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-937_en.htm (accessed 11 Nov. 2013). The investigation has been 
initiated following a formal complaint about Gazprom practices lodged with the Commission by Lithuania. 
Milda Seputyte, 'Lithuania Seeks EU Probe Into Possible Gazprom Abuse', Bloomberg, 25 Jan. 2011, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-25/lithuania-asks-eu-to-look-into-possible-market-abuse-by-
gazprom.html (accessed 11 Nov. 2013). 
4
 Three types of possible anticompetitive practices of Gazprom are under investigation: (1) usage of ‘no resale’ 
clauses in supply contracts—hindering a free flow of gas across the EU and effectively splitting up the single 
market; (2) prevention of diversification of gas supplies, which may be considered in breach of the special 
responsibility doctrine under Art. 102 TFEU (as articulated by the European Court of Justice in Case 322/81, NV 
Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, para 57); and (3) imposition of unfair 
(excessive, exploitative) pricing by linking oil and gas prices in long-term contacts. For more about the 
European Commission’s investigation and its broader context see Alan Riley, 'Commission v. Gazprom: The 
Antitrust Clash of the Decade?' (CEPS Policy Brief No. 285, 2012), http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/dld/7433/pdf 
(accessed 11 Nov. 2013); Nicolò Sartori, 'The European Commission vs. Gazprom: An Issue of Fair Competition 
or a Foreign Policy Quarrel?' (IAI Working Papers No. 13-03, 2013), 
http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1303.pdf (accessed 11 Nov. 2013). 
5
 As one commentator pointed out, the Order ‘was written with lighting speed and took all the companies … 
completely by surprise’. Konstantin von Eggert, 'Due West: Putin’s Intervention in Gazprom Probe Set to 
Backfire', RIA Novosti, 14 Sept. 2012, http://en.rian.ru/columnists/20120914/175955751.html (accessed 11 
Nov. 2013). 
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enforcement of outcomes of such processes. In fact, most types of blocking legislation fall into the 
first category. Such measures actually or potentially limit the collection of and access to information 
and evidence located in the forum for use in foreign proceedings. The second category encompasses 
only some types of the ‘pure’ blocking legislation. These are laws (1) preventing recognition and 
enforcement of foreign decisions and judgments, (2) allowing domestic companies to recover—via 
domestic processes—the damages paid by them in effect of foreign litigation (so-called claw-back 
provisions). 
Exhibit 1 Foreign Blocking Legislation: Typology 
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(distinction based on the stage of foreign enforcement being affected) 
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III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE ‘PURE’ BLOCKING LEGISLATION 
Blocking legislation was originally introduced in reaction to the US reliance on extraterritoriality in 
antitrust, as a mean of shortening the long arm of US jurisdiction. Probably the first such 
legislation—the Business Records Protection Act6—was introduced in the Canadian province of 
                                                          
6
 Business Records Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.19. 
‘Pure’ Blocking legislation 
• laws explicitly aimed  
at foreign discovery 
• laws preventing recognition 
and enforcement of foreign 
decisions and judgments  
• laws allowing for recovery of 
damages paid in effect of foreign 
litigation 
 
 
 • privacy protection legislation 
• professional secrecy laws 
• bank secrecy laws 
• laws on classified information 
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Ontario in 1947. It prohibited, subject to quasi-criminal sanctions,7 complying with foreign discovery 
orders. It was enacted in response to US discovery orders addressed to Canadian companies 
regarding production of documents for use in the US grand jury cartel investigation in the paper 
industry.8 Later blocking legislation was enacted—always reactively—in numerous jurisdictions, 
including: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, 
Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, and the UK.9 Moreover, in the antitrust context, blocking 
legislation was introduced only in reaction to the long reach of US jurisdiction. 
Initially most of the blocking statutes were very narrowly drafted. Some took the form of orders 
addressed to particular companies in their home jurisdictions prohibiting them from complying with 
US requests for documents,10 in some cases without clear legal basis.11 Sometimes such legislation 
applied only to a particular sector of the economy.12 The major wave of blocking litigation was 
enacted in response to the Uranium litigation in the US.13 The case was extremely politically charged. 
It concerned an international uranium cartel created by non-US uranium producers under the 
patronage and out of initiative of their respective governments in response to an official US 
prohibition on purchasing uranium from non-US producers.14 It led to the introduction and further 
development of blocking legislation internationally—in terms of the scope of application and gravity 
of its effect. In particular, the newly enacted legislation not only frustrated foreign investigations by 
hindering15 or barring16 access to business records. It also contained provisions either empowering 
                                                          
7
 These were quasi-criminal sanctions as under Section 91(27) of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867 the 
federal Parliament has the exclusive legislative jurisdiction to introduce criminal sanctions. See, generally, 
Patrick Malcolmson and Richard Myers, The Canadian Regime (University of Toronto Press, 2012) 137-38. 
8
 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian International Paper Co., 72 F.Supp. 1013 
(S.D.N.Y. 1947). 
9
 Many of the statutes have been reprinted in Alan Vaughan Lowe, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: an Annotated 
Collection of Legal Materials (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1983). See also extracts from diplomatic notes 
filed in and speeches relating to some of the earlier controversial cases in George Winthrop Haight, 'Extracts 
from some Published Material on Official Protests, Directives, Prohibitions, Comments, etc.', 51 International 
Law Association Reports of Conferences 565 (1964), at 129, 31. 
10
 That was the case in France, Italy, the Netherlands, and in the UK (see extracts reprinted in Haight, above 
n 9, at 569-70, 72.) in reaction to US investigation of an alleged international petroleum cartel in early 1950s. 
In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production, Transportation, Refining & 
Distribution of Petroleum (Oil Cartel), 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952). 
11
 As was the case in the UK. See Frederick Alexander Mann, 'Anglo-American Conflict of International 
Jurisdiction', 13(4) ICLQ 1460 (1964), at 1461-62. 
12
 One such example is blocking legislation introduced in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, and 
Sweden in response to US Federal Maritime Commission’s investigation, in the early 1960’s, of alleged 
breaches of US antitrust in maritime transport.  
13
 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F.Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979). 
14
 See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad, 3rd ed. (St. Paul Minn.: West 
Group, 1997-2010) § 6:14. See further Earle Gray, The Great Uranium Cartel (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1982). 
15
 For example, under Section 2 of the UK’s Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c. 11, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/11 (accessed 11 Nov. 2013) the Secretary of State has discretion to 
prohibit compliance with foreign discovery requests. Under Section 1 of the 1978 South African Protection of 
Business Act, Act 99, as amended, compliance with foreign discovery orders is prohibited, except when 
permitted by the Minister of Economic Affairs. The French blocking legislation—Law No. 80-538 of 16 July 
1980—prohibits compliance with any foreign discovery orders, apart from these made in line with 
international agreements. It makes it also unlawful to request any materials for use in foreign administrative or 
judicial proceedings, but for these made under international agreements. For an unofficial translation of the 
French blocking provisions and their analysis see Bate C. Toms III, 'The French Response to the Extraterritorial 
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authorities to block recognition and enforcement of foreign antitrust judgements,17 or blocking such 
recognition and enforcement by default.18 Moreover, some statutes contain claw-back provisions 
targeted at foreign (essentially US) multiple damages awards. When damages are paid by a company 
in a foreign jurisdiction, claw-back provisions provide a cause of action in the home jurisdiction 
against the plaintiff in the original action in the foreign jurisdiction (the recipient of the damages) to 
recover usually the non-compensatory part of the award. The UK was the first to enact such 
legislation.19 Australian claw-back provisions went even further. They allow for recovery of the full 
amount of the paid damages, as well as for the recovery of reasonable costs and expenses incurred 
in the underlying foreign antitrust proceedings.20 In 1990 the UK and Australia concluded an 
agreement on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments,21 covering also claw-back 
judgments—hence increasing the chances for their successful enforcement. The blocking statutes 
introduced in the wake of the Uranium litigation, in the mid-1980s, are the most recent examples—
except for the 2012 Russian blocking Order—of such measures adopted in reaction to extraterritorial 
enforcement of domestic competition laws.  
While the invocation of blocking legislation, in the narrow sense, has been relatively rare,22 in most 
cases it remains on the books and may be used in future. Although the history of blocking statutes is 
intertwined with US extraterritoriality in antitrust, similar laws were also enacted in other areas of 
law.23 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Application of United States Antitrust Laws,' 15 Int'l Law. 585 (1981). Compare Pierre Grosdidier, 'The French 
Blocking Statute, the Hague Evidence Convention, and the Case Law: Lessons for French Parties Responding to 
American Discovery' (2011), http://www.haynesboone.com/french_blocking_statute/ (accessed 11 Nov. 
2013). 
16
 For example, Section 2 of the Quebec’s Business Concerns Records Act, R.S.Q., c. D-12, bars removal of any 
business records in response to any foreign—or even Canadian, but not from Quebec—discovery orders. 
17
 For example, under Section 8 of the Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-29, 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/F-29/ (accessed 11 Nov. 2013), the Attorney General of Canada may 
declare a foreign antitrust judgment non-recognizable or non-enforceable in any manner in Canada, if (s)he is 
of the opinion that the judgment adversely affects or is likely to adversely affect significant Canadian interests, 
or if it is likely to infringe Canadian sovereignty. See further William C. Graham, 'The Foreign Extraterritorial 
Measures Act', 11 Can. Bus. L. J. 410 (1985). 
18
 For example, under Section 1 of the South African blocking statute (see above note 15). 
19
 Section 6 of the UK’s Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (see above note 15). 
20
 Sections 10 and 11 of the Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984, No. 3, as amended. The 
current as well as previous versions of the Act are available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A02867 (accessed 11 Nov. 2013). 
21
 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial 
Matters [1994] ATS 27. 
22
 In this vein Jonathan M. Jacobson and ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments, 6th ed. 
(ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2007) 1256. 
23
 For example, recently both the EU and Japan introduced legislation providing for non-recognition and claw-
back of awards based on the US Antidumping Act of 1916. The Act was found inconsistent with the US 
obligations within the WTO framework and while the US Congress repealed it, it was done on a prospective 
basis. Waller, above n 14, at § 3:11. Japan and the EU enacted legislation allowing for recovery of paid 
damages, fees and costs. Ibid, at § 4:17. See further Mitsuo Matsushita and Aya Iino, 'The Blocking Legislation 
as a Countermeasure to the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916: A Comparative Analysis of the EC and Japanese 
Damage Recovery', 40(4) J. World Trade (2006). 
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IV. FUNCTIONS AND LEGALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Blocking legislation serves two principal functions. First, from the enacting State’s perspective it 
serves as a sword. It cuts through foreign enforcement measures, disallowing their effectuation in 
the forum. Hence, from the forum’s standpoint blocking legislation protects its territorial integrity 
and sovereignty. In this context it must be underlined that while States may in certain circumstances 
assume extraterritorial prescriptive (subject-matter) jurisdiction over foreign persons and foreign 
conduct, enforcement jurisdiction remains territorial. No State can exercise enforcement jurisdiction 
in the territory of another State without its consent (and that consent normally cannot be 
substituted by a private party consent).24 The notion of enforcement jurisdiction encompasses 
enforcement through both physical use of force and peaceable performance of acts of an authority. 
The latter category includes collection of evidence as well as the conduct of an investigation.  
Second, from the perspective of a party facing litigation or investigation abroad, domestic blocking 
legislation can be a shield. In particular, a defendant could argue before foreign courts or authorities 
that under domestic laws it cannot comply with, for example, foreign discovery orders. Hence, 
blocking legislation allows the defendant to rely on foreign State compulsion as a defence. 
Commentators identified this function of blocking statutes early on and argued that it was its key 
purpose.25 The shielding function is somewhat problematic, especially when a particular statute 
blocks foreign enforcement measures by default. While it may potentially shield some companies 
from foreign litigation, it also hinders other domestic companies’ capacity to properly engage in legal 
processes abroad. For example, such legislation makes it cumbersome for domestic companies 
willing to defend their case in a foreign forum. It also hinders their ability to sue in foreign forums, 
since they may also not be able to comply with discovery ordered in relation to actions which they 
have themselves initiated.  
Given that enforcement jurisdiction is considered strictly territorial, domestic measures prohibiting 
the compliance by natural and legal persons with foreign orders do not violate international law. 
Similarly, taking into consideration that there is no general obligation under international law to 
recognize and enforce foreign judgments26 or decisions,27 blocking legislation explicitly hindering or 
ruling out such recognition and enforcement violates no international norm or custom.28 At the 
same time, while not violating international law, blocking legislation can be seen as incompatible 
                                                          
24
 Frederick Alexander Mann, 'The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law', 111 Recueil des Cours 1 
(1964), at 138-41.  
25
 In this vein, for example, Mann, above n 11, at 1463. At the same time, as Waller points out, blocking 
legislation constitutes a form of negative compulsion. It is ‘usually not geared to advancing any affirmative 
policy’ of a foreign state. Spencer Weber Waller, 'Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S. Antitrust 
Law: The Japanese Auto Restraints and Beyond', 14 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 747 (1982), at 780. In the US it is 
recognized that while the compelled defendant is entitled to be completely freed from liability, when blocking 
legislation is involved ‘a variety of adverse inferences are permissible’ and the statutes ‘need not be given the 
same deference … as differences in substantive rules of law.’ American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law 
(Third): Foreign Relations Law of the United States (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1987) § 
442, n 5. 
26
 Ralf Michaels, 'Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments' in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online ed. (OUP, 2009) para 11. 
27
 Matthias Ruffert, 'Recognition of Foreign Legislative and Administrative Acts' in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online ed. (OUP, 2007) para 6. 
28
 On the other hand, some constructions of claw-back provisions may be seen in certain circumstances as 
problematic. 
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with the spirit of international cooperation. In most instances the invocation of such laws has led 
only to more international friction. In fact, an enactment of blocking legislation itself—in reaction to 
foreign litigation or investigation—suggests, at the very least, significant mistrust of the enacting 
State in the legal processes and / or norms of the foreign jurisdiction. 
 
V. NEW RUSSIAN BLOCKING ORDER AND THE 2011 RUSSIA/EU ANTITRUST MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING 
A week after the European Commission announced that it had opened formal proceedings to 
investigate practices of Gazprom in light of EU competition law, the President of the Russian 
Federation, Vladimir Putin, signed a blocking Order.29 The Order applies to all joint stock companies 
that enjoy the status of Russian strategic enterprises. The list of such companies was originally 
composed in 2004.30 It includes numerous State-owned companies, among them Gazprom, Rosneft, 
etc. but also Russian Railways, Aeroflot, the main Russian TV channel, the international airports. 
Effectively, operations of a few dozen companies fall under the regime of the blocking Order. 
The Order stipulates that its addressees require prior Russian government’s consent to: 
1) provide information concerning their business operations to foreign authorities;31 
2) amend:32 
a. contracts concluded with foreign counterparts, 
b. other documents relating to their commercial policy (including pricing) abroad; or 
3) dispose of:33 
a. shares in foreign companies,  
b. rights to carry out business in foreign countries, 
c. immovable property located abroad. 
In other words, the Order fits within the notion of ‘pure’ blocking legislation.34 It has the potential of 
affecting foreign enforcement both: (1) at the stage of investigation or adjudication—by hindering or 
blocking access to evidence, and (2) at the stage of implementation of the outcomes of such 
processes—by frustrating compliance with potential injunctions or required behavioural and 
structural remedies. 
                                                          
29
 Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation No 1285 of 11 September 2012 on Measures to 
Protect Russian Federation Interests in Russian Legal Entities’ Foreign Economic Activities, above n 2.  
30
 Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation No 1009 of 4 August 2004 Approving the List of 
Strategic Enterprises and Strategic Joint Stock Companies [Указ Президента РФ от 4 августа 2004 г. N 1009 
"Об утверждении перечня стратегических предприятий и стратегических акционерных обществ"],  (4 
Aug. 2004), as amended, http://text.document.kremlin.ru/document?id=3900734&byPara=1 (accessed 11 
Nov. 2013). 
31
 Section 1(a) of the Order No 1285, above n 2. Note that the prior consent is not required with regard to 
information subject to publication and disclosure requirement under Russian legislation and information 
required in connection with issuance, circulation and acquisition of securities. 
32
 Section 1(b) of the Order No 1285, above n 2. 
33
 Section 1(c) of the Order No 1285, above n 2. 
34
 See above Part II of this article. 
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Compliance with foreign requests mentioned in the Order requires the consent of a relevant federal 
executive body authorised by the Russian government.35 In October 2012 the Russian government 
entrusted eleven bodies with such competence and assigned particular companies to each of 
them.36 Effectively, each nominated body has an exclusive mandate to review requests for 
compliance from companies in a particular sector of the economy. For example, the Ministry of 
Energy is responsible for Gazprom, Rosneft, and Transneft; the Ministry of Transport is responsible 
for Aeroflot and Russian Railways and so on.  
The blocking Order states that consent shall not be granted if the sought actions could harm the 
economic interests of the Russian Federation.37 It does not clarify any further what these are, what 
time perspective (short v. long-term) should be used in an assessment, or what criteria shall govern 
determination of a possible impact of the sought foreign measures on the Russian economic 
interests. No test has been laid down. Moreover, adding another layer of difficulty, procedures 
safeguarding obtaining consent are not uniform—each of the nominated federal executive bodies 
was to adopt its own rules. These are likely to matter in practice. Effectively, under the blocking 
Order the federal executive bodies have a far-reaching discretion on the matter.  
The rapid and unanticipated issuance of the Order within a matter of days after the European 
Commission’s official opening of the proceedings, looking into Gazprom’s practices in light of EU 
competition rules, suggests that the Order was issued to hinder this particular investigation and, 
possibly, to prevent similar foreign investigations or legal actions in future. The fact that compliance 
with foreign requests—even for the purposes of investigatory and adjudicatory purposes—is subject 
to the consent of the Russian government, attempts to move the underlying controversy from the 
sphere of rule-of-law to the realm of politics. The issuance of the blocking Order itself may be seen 
as ‘an admission that Gazprom has something to hide’.38 This is particularly so given that the Order’s 
default rule is a prohibition (of compliance) which may or may not be lifted by the Russian 
authorities’ consent. The alternative was to introduce a notifying requirement and to allow for 
compliance by default, but for an explicit prohibition by the authorities.39 While the same outcome 
can be achieved in terms of protecting State’s important interests, the latter model would be more 
favourably perceived internationally. A default rule of prohibition sends a strong message. 
The Russian Federation has a right—as do all sovereign States—to protect its interests as it sees fit 
within the limits set by international law. As earlier discussed, blocking legislation is not a new 
invention40 and in general it does not violate international law.41 The novel aspect of the Russian 
blocking Order is that it also subjects compliance with possible foreign remedies to Russian 
government’s consent. In past, the blocking legislation in antitrust, apart from discovery, focused 
                                                          
35
 Section 2 of the Order No 1285, above n 2. 
36
 Resolution of the Russian Government No 1017 of 5 October 2012 on Measures  Aimed at Implementation 
of an Order of the President of the Russian Federation No 1285 of 11 September 2012 [Постановление 
Правительства Российской Федерации от 5 октября 2012 г. N 1017 г. о мерах по реализации Указа 
Президента Российской Федерации от 11 сентября 2012 г. N 1285],  (2012), 
http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=136293 (accessed 11 Nov. 2013). 
37
 Section 2 of the Order No 1285, above n 2. 
38
 von Eggert, above n 5. 
39
 This type of blocking legislation operates, for example, in Canada. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 
1985, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-29, s. 1. 
40
 See above notes 6-9 and accompanying text. 
41
 See above Part IV of this article. 
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predominantly on partial non-recognition of multiple damages awards. This was underpinned by 
cultural and systemic differences. In the past, the US was—and still is—one of very few jurisdictions 
allowing for treble damages in private antitrust actions.42 This was—and still is—seen as a punitive 
solution and it is not widely recognised in the sphere of private enforcement outside the US. The 
Russian blocking Order produces very different effects. It says nothing about fines or damages, but it 
effectively requires Russian government’s consent for introducing changes in important aspects of 
firm’s foreign-oriented business operations. This is striking. In the EU-Russia context, it is exclusively 
for the EU and its Member States to lay down rules governing the EU marketplace (including 
competition law and policy). It is an unacceptable proposition that EU’s jurisdiction over Russian 
companies operating in the EU should be subjected, in any regard, to Russia’s consent. 
Regardless of its status under international law, the Russian blocking Order is an unfriendly measure, 
which goes against the spirit of international cooperation. This is particularly so in the Russia-EU 
context in light of the Memorandum of Understanding concluded in 2011 between the Russian 
Federal Antimonopoly Service and the EU’s DG Competition.43 Although not a hard law instrument, 
the Memorandum recognizes the obstacles posed by anticompetitive conduct and the importance of 
cooperation in competition law enforcement. 
From the perspective of the European Commission’s investigation of Gazprom practices, it is unlikely 
that the Order will have any important hindering effects at the investigation stage. In September 
2011—a year before opening of the formal investigation—the Commission conducted dawn raids in 
various EU Member States.44 It had an opportunity to collect information regarding the practices 
under scrutiny. Given the value of commerce involved and, hence, the economic significance of this 
case, it is doubtful that the Commission would have moved ahead and opened the formal 
proceedings without having collected materials strongly indicating that EU competition rules were 
violated. In other words, the Commission may not now need more information from Gazprom to 
thoroughly investigate its business practices. If that is so, then the blocking Order will have limited 
impact on the investigation at this stage. 
The situation is bound to get more complex should there be a finding of a violation of EU 
competition law. The blocking Order provides that Gazprom requires Russian government’s consent 
to, for example, change its contracts with foreign counterparts. Given the nature of the business 
practices under investigation,45 changes in contractual relationships may be one of the ordered 
remedies. Without Russia’s consent Gazprom will not be able to comply. This potentially brings the 
State action doctrine into play—a defence possibly protecting Gazprom from sanctions for non-
                                                          
42
 Treble damages are also available in private antitrust actions, for example, in Taiwan (under Art. 32 of the 
Fair Trade Act) and in Panama (under Art. 30 of the Law 45/2007 on the Protection and Defense of 
Competition). 
43
 Memorandum of Understanding on Competition between the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian 
Federation and DG Competition of the European Commission,  (10 Mar. 2011), 
http://en.fas.gov.ru/international-cooperation/bilateral-and-multilateral-documents/bilateral-and-
multilateral-documents_50730.html (accessed 11 Nov. 2013). 
44
 See European Commission, MEMO/11/641, Antitrust: Commission Confirms Unannounced Inspections in the 
Natural Gas Sector (27 Sept. 2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-641_en.htm (accessed 11 
Nov. 2013). See also Alessandro Torello, 'EU Raids Natural-Gas Companies in Probe ', Wall Street Journal, 27 
Sept. 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204831304576596993538359656.html (accessed 
11 Nov. 2013). 
45
 See above note 4. 
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compliance, if it proves it was compelled not to comply.46 To make a long story short: the lack of 
Russian government’s consent for Gazprom compliance with possible remedies will unavoidably lead 
to a significant political conflict with potentially far-reaching and long-lasting consequences in the 
EU-Russia political and trade relations. It will boil down to the fundamental issue of who has 
jurisdiction over entities operating within the EU. 
The blocking Order will also have consequences reaching beyond the Gazprom investigation. Firstly 
and most fundamentally, its rapid and unexpected enactment shows that there is a great deal of 
unpredictability and perhaps also additional risk when engaging in business with Russian State-
owned companies. The rules of the game may change suddenly.47 Secondly, the everyday life of 
Russian companies, falling under the scope of application of the blocking Order, will be more 
difficult.48 Many operate abroad or have foreign subsidiaries. They need to comply with foreign 
rules, often imposing various reporting or disclosure requirements. The blocking Order stipulates 
that  each time they need a Russian government’s consent to comply with their obligations in those 
jurisdictions in which they operate. This poses practical difficulties and it is unlikely to meet with the 
understanding of foreign partners. Thirdly, if the European Commission finds that Gazprom violated 
EU competition rules and if Gazprom will be unable to comply with the ordered remedies, the 
emerging conflict will inevitably negatively affect Russia’s image and its relations, especially with 
other open and free-market economies. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The recent enactment of a blocking Order in Russia brings the issue of blocking legislation back into 
the limelight. This paper provided a typology of such measures and presented their development, 
functions, and discussed their legality under international law, in the quest for further clarification of 
law governing transnational commerce. It also presented and analysed the new Russian measure 
both in the context of the on-going antitrust investigation of Gazprom’s practices by the European 
Commission as well as more generally as affecting all Russian strategic firms operating 
internationally. 
The newly introduced Russian blocking Order, at the very minimum, shows that Russia is very 
anxious about its strategic enterprises being subject to foreign regulatory regimes even when 
operating abroad. The introduced default rule is one of general prohibition of compliance with 
foreign measures. This carries a political message and should not be underestimated, especially 
since an alternative was available—Russian President could have allowed for compliance by default, 
                                                          
46
 For more on the State action doctrine see Marek Martyniszyn, 'A Comparative Look on Foreign State 
Compulsion as a Defence in Antitrust Litigation', 8(2) Competition L. Rev. 143 (2012),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986032 (accessed 11 Nov. 2013); Eric  Blomme, 'State Action as a Defence Against 
81 and 82 EC', 30(2) World Competition 243 (2007); Fernando Castillo de la Torre, 'State Action Defence in EC 
Competition Law', 28(4) World Competition 407 (2005). 
47
 In a broader context, commenting on various recent pieces of legislation enacted in Russia, the EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, 
Catherine Ashton commented in the European Parliament that ‘this trend raises serious questions as to the 
state of the rule of law in the country, in particular the use of legal and law enforcement structures and other 
instruments for political purposes rather than for protecting and safeguarding the rights and freedoms of the 
citizens of Russia.’ Catherine Ashton, 'Statement on the Political Use of Justice in Russia' (European Parliament, 
11 Sept.  2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-598_en.htm (accessed 11 Nov. 2013). 
48
 Same point was raised by commentators. See, for example, von Eggert, above n 5. 
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but for an explicit prohibition in a particular case. He did not choose to follow that approach. The 
adopted measure is restrictive in nature and it goes against the spirit of international cooperation. 
The Order is unlikely to play any important, practical role during the European Commission’s 
antitrust investigation at this early stage. Assuming that Gazprom will be found in violation of EU 
competition law, then at the stage of enforcement of remedies depending on whether the necessary 
consent shall or shall not be granted by Russian authorities, the blocking Order may lead to a 
significant friction between the EU and the Russian Federation. The proverbial ball will be in the 
Russian court. If the Russian authorities do not allow Gazprom to comply with the outcome of the 
proceedings in the EU, the conflict is likely to escalate. In more general terms, the Order will make 
everyday business operations of Russian strategic enterprises more cumbersome. They will have to 
seek Russian’s authorities consent when requested to comply with foreign reporting or disclosure 
requests, or when facing discovery requests abroad, even when they themselves brought the suit. 
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Annex I 
The original text of the Order comes from the official website of the President of the Russian 
Federation.49 The English translation has been created for the purposes of this article by its author.  
 
Указ Президента РФ 
от 11 сентября 2012 г. N 1285 
"О мерах по защите интересов Российской 
Федерации при осуществлении российскими 
юридическими лицами внешнеэкономической 
деятельности" 
Executive Order of the President  
of the Russian Federation 
No 1285 of 11 September 2012 
on Measures to Protect Russian Federation 
Interests in Russian Legal Entities’ Foreign 
Economic Activities 
 
В целях защиты интересов Российской 
Федерации при осуществлении российскими 
юридическими лицами внешнеэкономической 
деятельности постановляю: 
In order to protect the interests of the 
Russian Federation in Russian legal entities’ foreign 
economic activities it is ordered that:  
1. Установить, что открытые акционерные 
общества, включенные в перечень 
стратегических предприятий и стратегических 
акционерных обществ, утвержденный Указом 
Президента Российской Федерации от 4 августа 
2004 г. N 1009 "Об утверждении перечня 
стратегических предприятий и стратегических 
акционерных обществ" (далее - акционерные 
общества), и их дочерние хозяйственные 
общества в случае предъявления к ним 
требований со стороны органов иностранных 
государств, международных организаций, 
союзных объединений иностранных государств, 
органов (институтов) этих организаций и 
объединений, включая органы регулирования и 
(или) контроля, вправе только с 
предварительного согласия федерального 
органа исполнительной власти, 
уполномоченного Правительством Российской 
Федерации: 
1. Open joint stock companies enjoying the 
status of strategic enterprises and strategic joint 
stock companies, as established by the Executive 
Order of the President of the Russian Federation 
No 1009 of 4 August 2004 Approving the List of 
Strategic Enterprises and Strategic Joint Stock 
Companies (henceforth referred to as joint stock 
companies), and their subsidiaries in an event of 
any request made by agencies of foreign 
governments, international organizations, 
associations and unions of foreign governments, 
agencies (authorities) of such organizations and 
associations, including their regulatory and (or) 
supervisory authorities may only subject to a prior 
consent of the federal executive body authorized 
by the Government of the Russian Federation: 
а) предоставлять этим органам, 
организациям и объединениям информацию, 
касающуюся своей деятельности. Без 
предварительного согласия федерального 
органа исполнительной власти, 
уполномоченного Правительством Российской 
Федерации, акционерные общества и их 
дочерние хозяйственные общества вправе 
предоставлять таким органам, организациям и 
объединениям информацию, подлежащую 
опубликованию или раскрытию в соответствии с 
законодательством Российской Федерации, а 
также в соответствии с требованиями, 
a) provide such agencies, organizations and 
associations with information regarding their 
activities. Without the prior consent of the federal 
executive body authorized by the Government of 
the Russian Federation, joint stock companies and 
their subsidiaries may provide such agencies, 
organizations and associations with information 
which is subject to publishing or disclosure 
requirements under laws of the Russian 
Federation, as well as information required in 
connection with issuance, circulation and 
acquisition of securities; 
                                                          
49
 http://text.document.kremlin.ru/document?id=70125938&byPara=1 (accessed 11 Nov. 2013). 
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предъявляемыми в связи с выпуском, 
обращением и приобретением ценных бумаг; 
б) вносить изменения в договоры, 
заключенные акционерными обществами и их 
дочерними хозяйственными обществами с 
иностранными контрагентами, и в другие 
документы, касающиеся их коммерческой 
(ценовой) политики в иностранных 
государствах; 
b) amend agreements (contracts) concluded 
by the joint stock companies and their subsidiaries 
with foreign counterparts, and other documents 
relating to their commercial policy (including 
pricing) in foreign countries; 
в) отчуждать принадлежащие 
акционерным обществам и их дочерним 
хозяйственным обществам доли участия в 
иностранных организациях, права на 
осуществление предпринимательской 
деятельности на территориях иностранных 
государств и недвижимое имущество, 
находящееся за рубежом. 
c) dispose of their shares in foreign 
companies, rights to carry out business activities 
on foreign soil, and titles to immovable property 
located abroad, belonging to such joint stock 
companies and their subsidiaries. 
2. Установить, что федеральный орган 
исполнительной власти, уполномоченный 
Правительством Российской Федерации, 
отказывает в согласии на осуществление 
действий, предусмотренных пунктом 1 
настоящего Указа, если эти действия способны 
нанести ущерб экономическим интересам 
Российской Федерации. 
2. The federal executive body authorized by 
the Government of the Russian Federation shall 
refuse to grant consent to implementation of the 
actions mentioned in Section 1 of this Order, if 
such actions could harm the economic interests of 
the Russian Federation. 
3. Правительству Российской Федерации в 
месячный срок определить федеральные 
органы исполнительной власти, 
уполномоченные давать акционерным 
обществам и их дочерним хозяйственным 
обществам согласие на осуществление 
действий, предусмотренных пунктом 1 
настоящего Указа. 
3. Government of the Russian Federation 
within one month shall nominate the federal 
executives bodies, authorized to grant joint stock 
companies and their subsidiaries consent for 
implementation of the actions mentioned in 
Section 1 of this Order. 
 
4. Настоящий Указ вступает в силу со дня 
его официального опубликования. 
4. This Order shall enter into force on the day 
of its official publication. 
Президент Российской Федерации  
В. Путин 
 
Москва, Кремль 
11 сентября 2012 года 
N 1285 
President of the Russian Federation 
V. Putin 
 
Moscow, Kremlin 
September 11, 2012 
No 1285 
 
